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thresholds regarding the onset of deleterious environmental impacts or
consequences. Group and individual behavior were examined in an ex-
perimental setting designed to model common-pools in which there ex-
isted such a threshold using three distinct treatments: one with com-
plete information of the threshold, one with incomplete information of
the threshold and one with sporadically enforced targets. By design the
true threshold was unknown to the players in the role of policymaker,
and the guesses of the threshold value were allowed to change during
every round. Sporadically enforced targets had a significant negative
effect on the lifespan of a common-pool resource and individual gains.
Allowing the participants to develop and act on their own beliefs for
the location of the threshold improved both individual benefit and con-
servation of the common-pool. Conservation of common-pool resources
will be best achieved through policies which allow users of the resource
access to reliable information regarding the status of the common-pool
and which enable the development of their own beliefs regarding the
location of threshold.
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I. Introduction
Common-pool resources have been a focus of both economic research and governmen-
tal policy. The “Tragedy of the Commons” explains that Common-Pool Resources suffer
from overuse and degradation (Hardin, 1968). Establishment of effective governmental
policies for conservation of Common-Pool Resources are needed as without definitive
intervention this diminishment will continue, especially as demands for resources in-
crease with a growing population. The struggle for policy makers to resolve the conflict
between resource conservation and the growing current resource needs ultimately results
in ever changing polices. This conflict can be observed in policies addressing a variety
of common-pool resource problems around the globe, like pollution and emission reg-
ulations, fisheries management, and water resources management. In order to prevent
disastrous environmental impacts in those instances polices to limit resource use were
created, but when the time comes for the polices to go into effect, due to current resource
demands, policies are pushed off or left unenforced. This raises the question, “what is
the impact of lack of policy target enforcement and threshold uncertainty on the lifespan
of common pool resources?”
This paper addresses Common-Pool Resources in the context of lack of governmen-
tal commitment and follow-through, which in turn creates policies and policy targets
which are constantly readjusted. In order to prevent the crossing of inherent natural re-
source and common-pool thresholds, and keep deleterious environmental consequences
from going into effect, policies which set resource limits/targets are often put into place.
However, biased by the present and struggling to commit to the current policy, the targets,
limits and policies are readjusted. Analysis of the impact of changing policy targets and
threshold uncertainty on group and individual resource use behavior and the longevity
of the common-pool resources has not been thoroughly examined. Through laboratory
experiments it is seen that when policy targets go unenforced or are readjusted it leads
to shorter Common-Pool Resource lifespans. The finding of this research are critical
to addressing environmental and resource management problems and the development
of more effective long term policies.This paper has broader implications for other gov-
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ernment policies and develops a case for policies which promote widespread access to
reliable information on the common-pool resource. Allowing the users of the resource
to have access to reliable information regarding the level and status of the common pool
resource is optimal for Common-Pool Resource conservation and will be demonstrated
in this paper.
This process of repetitive threshold readjustment is something which affects many
areas of government. This is the norm for establishing the U.S governmental debt ceil-
ing(Deb, 2011).1 It is already happening with Corporate Average Fuel Economy Stan-
dards and is likely to be seen with the U.S. greenhouse gas emission regulations (Smith,
2011; Horowitz, 1996).2 The consequences of repetitive threshold readjustment have not
fully been studied. Correˆa, Kahn, and Freitas (2014) examine unenforced fishing man-
agement policies. They found that fishing defesos were left completely unenforced in the
Brazilian Amazon and that in the absence of enforcement there was an increase in the
number of fishers, leading to a decline in fish stocks.3 “In short, the current [unenforced]
policy is worse than no policy,” (Correˆa, Kahn, and Freitas, 2014) .
Correˆa, Kahn, and Freitas (2014) is one of the first to examine the impacts and con-
sequences of unenforced common-pool resource management policy, since the findings
and results are from the Brazilian Amazon it is important to combine these results with
results from a study which is more general. This will allow conclusions to be drawn
which one can then apply not only to the Amazon, but to other common-pool resource
settings. In other examples, like those mentioned above, a study with field data would
not be possible since the only observation is the given case, there is no counter-factual
data available. Laboratory experiments offer the cleanest possible approach for identify-
ing treatment effects. A laboratory study adding to the findings of Correˆa et al. and other
literature, to address moving policy targets, in a general context, would have application
1Between 1995 and February 2011 the debt ceiling has been raised 12 times(Deb, 2011).
2“The Obama Administration will not meet its September deadline for releasing its 2025 Corporate Average Fuel
Economy (CAFE) standards. The new deadline is mid-November of this year [2025]. CAFE is a national effort to
increase fleet-wide vehicle fuel-economy averages to 54.5 mpg by 2025.,”Smith (2011).
3A fishing defeso is a type of fishing regulation which utilizes a closed season and fishing permits that require fish-
ermen to stagger their entry, limiting the number of fishermen with access to the fishery at any one time. With defesos
fishermen are also compensated during times which they do not have access to the fishery.
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for all areas of common-pool resource management. Additionally, laboratory studies are
able to create controls and can develop a greater understanding of the driving factors
behind common-pool resource depletion and user behavior.4
To understand the impacts of changing threshold policies and threshold uncertainty I
conducted a Common-Pool Resource laboratory experiment in which groups of five with-
draw tokens from a shared pool with a threshold for punishment, similar to an inherent
threshold for environmental consequences. There were three experimental treatments,
1.) Complete Information, 2.) Incomplete Information and 3.) Sporadically Enforced
Targets. In Complete Information the punishment threshold is revealed to all partici-
pants and is automatically enforced. In Incomplete Information the punishment thresh-
old location is unknown to resource users. Sporadically Enforced Targets represents the
real-world case in which the conflict between current and future resource use results in
changing policy targets. In Sporadically Enforced Targets, guesses of the threshold loca-
tion are made by a group policy maker and could be enforced before a new policy maker
is assigned. The basic game and experiment will be explained in Section 2. In Section
3 my hypothesis is shared. Results and a discussion of the experimental findings can be
found in Section 4. Conclusion and policy recommendations follow in Section 5.
A. Background
Water resources present a particularly relevant system for illustrating the interventions
of policymakers and the need for a greater understanding of their impacts. As an exam-
ple, Lake Kinneret provides two-thirds of Israel’s water and serves as a source of water
for neighboring countries in exchange for peace.5 In an already tense region, a shortage
of Israel’s water resources would not only strain diplomatic relationships across borders,
but would also place an undue burden on the economy and on human and environmental
4In Correˆa, Kahn, and Freitas(2014), through survey, they were able to determine that with unenforced fishing man-
agement policies in the Amazon the Catch Per Unit Effort (CPUE) had decreased. Since the number of fishermen had
increased in addition to the decline in fish stock. Therefore, it was unclear if the decrease in CPUE is attributed to the
open-access externality or the decrease in the fish stock. In a laboratory study one is able to control for resource users
and would be able to effectively account for changes in effort or other user behavior attributed to chages in resource stock
and changes in the number of resource users.
5Lake Kinneret is also known as the Sea of Galilee or Lake Tiberias.
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health (Starr, 1991). Israel withdraws more water than the natural rate of replenishment,
creating an annual water deficit of approximately 4,200 million cubic meters (Kislev,
2001). Since water is a basic human right, the price of water is set to near zero. The
annual water deficit continues to increase as the demand for water grows and the price of
water remains low (Berman and Wihbey, 1999; Plaut, 2000).
Israel’s water issues can be thought of as a common-pool resource problem based
on three characteristics: (Dasgupta and Heal, 1979; Gardner et al., 1990; Sethi and So-
manathan, 1996; Hardin, 1968) 1.) Water can be withdrawn over time and is rival in
consumption. The water that an individual demands and subsequently consumes cannot
be utilized by any other consumer. Many stakeholders demand water from the Kinneret
including but not limited to individuals, agriculture and industry across multiple coun-
tries. 2.) The current amount of water which is withdrawn from the Kinneret is subopti-
mal (Starr, 1991; Amir and Fisher, 2006). 3.) There does exist a more efficient level of
water use. To combat the depletion of water, the Israeli government created an invisible
threshold, or “red line,” in the Kinneret to mark a danger level for the water level.6 In
theory, if the amount of water in the Kinneret drops below this threshold, the government
will take action and stop pumping water from the Kinneret to prevent saltwater intrusion
and complete depletion of the resource (Feitelson and Fischhendler, 2005).
However, as the water level approaches or drops below the “red line,” the govern-
ment shifts the threshold downward (Parparpov et al., 2013; Plaut, 2000; Feitelson and
Fischhendler, 2005).7 As a result of the decline in water level below the threshold, be-
fore or after the threshold adjustment, consumers were not faced with penalties from the
government, such as changes in the price of water or a decrease in water availability.
However, there are consequences including changes to the ecological system and envi-
ronment, challenges in changing infrastructure to account for the lower water level, and
a non-optimal allocation of resources.
6The natural threshold is the water level below which the Kinneret would have damaging environmental conse-
quences, such as saltwater intrusion, and water depletion. The red line threshold was created as a warning for the natural
threshold. It should not to be mistaken for the natural threshold itself.
7The status of Kinneret and the red line appear frequently in news headlines in Israel. “Kinneret Drops Under Lower
Red Line’” from Israel National News is an example of one headline illustrating that the water level in the Kinneret
surpassed the Red Line.
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The original threshold was created so that future policymakers would be aware of
the water shortage and impending environmental consequences for over-extraction and
eventually devise a solution to the challenges of meeting the water demands of Israel
and its neighbors in a sustainable manner (Feitelson and Fischhendler, 2005). Since this
threshold was not permanently and irrevocably established, policymakers continue to re-
peatedly lower the threshold, passing the problem on to future policymakers, each time
neither willing to give up consumption today nor to meaningfully address water conser-
vation. The changing “red line” threshold demonstrates the continual conflict that faces
the Israeli government as the steward of this water resource. While the government and
current policymakers recognize that there is a water problem, there is a trade-off between
conserving the resource with the associated costs of limiting consumption today versus
the less immediate cost of depleting the resource and its value. This is the situation ad-
dressed by Horowitz (1996) with theoretical literature on governmental present biased
preferences.8 Consumers and policymakers may not know the exact point at which the
value of the resource drops to nearly zero. They are tasked with balancing the conflict
between consumption and conservation and devising a solution before the resource be-
comes valueless.
While Correˆa, Kahn, and Freitas (2014) is one of the first studies to examine a spe-
cific unenforced common-pool resource management policy, examining a specific case
of unenforced fishing policy in the Brazilian Amazon, other literature has addressed the
impacts of not following through with rules and punishments in other settings (Aschuler,
2000; Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2009; Bloch, 1998; Stormshak et al., 2000). Albert
Alschuler (2000) explains in his book that unenforced laws lead people to commit more
crimes of various natures. Investigators in the fields of behavioral psychology and edu-
cation have studied child performance and behavior with various parenting styles. They
found that when parents do not enforce rules and their associated punishments, children
exhibit more extreme and disruptive behaviors (Stormshak et al., 2000). For example,
8Horowitz (1996) examined pollution emission under both a market and non-market discount rate, finding that a non-
market discount rate results in governmental present preferences. This ultimately results in higher levels of pollution.
This was purely a theoretical work.
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not enforcing the rules, such as continually adding more numbers to count to after “10,”
is worse than not having the rules in the first place. This is also supported in studies
of crime and unenforced laws. Bloch (1998) compares various methods of automobile
speed-control and finds that when the speed limit is unenforced, drivers exceed the speed
limit more frequently and to a greater extent than the when the speed limit is enforced.
Bhattacharya and Daouk (2009) show, both in a theoretical and empirical framework,
when an unenforced law can be worse than having no law at all. They found that this is
the case when 1.) motivation for the law is to solve a prisoner’s dilemma (if there was
no law everyone would be stuck in the bad equilibrium) and 2.) some people will follow
the law regardless of it being enforced.
To date no experimental approach regarding common-pool resources has incorporated
thresholds or a moving target. This paper addresses this gap in knowledge by identi-
fying the relative effect of continually readjusted targets and threshold uncertainty on
the longevity of a common-pool resource through the use of laboratory experiments.
Through these experiments I find that natural resources are best manged when policy
makers are constantly informing resource users of the level of the common pool while
also making them aware that a threshold for consequences exists. I also found that there
exist significant detrimental effects on the lifespans of common pool resources when
polices and thresholds are not enforced. Unenforced, moving policy targets result in a
significantly shorter common pool lifespan.
Past common-pool resource experiments have not examined cases of individual be-
havior when a threshold exists. There have been other experiments in which individuals
evaluate depletion of a common-pool resource when there is some externality associated
with the depletion. However, many public goods games have incorporated thresholds.
Sell and Son (1997) show common-pool resource experiments have similar results to
public goods games when there is interaction among the participants. Threshold public
goods games have been studied, but only with a fixed threshold (Palfrey and Rosenthal,
1984; Bagnoli M, 1989, 1992). Marks and Croson (1999) examined contributions to
threshold public goods under uncertainty and incomplete information. They found that
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the lack of information of the other group members’ valuation of the public good had no
impact on contributions to or the provision of the public good. McBride (2006) examined
public good contributions and determined that when there is uncertainty with threshold
if the public good is low valued the the uncertainty leads to fewer contributions, but in
if the public good is high valued uncertainty leads to a greater level of contributions.
Some common-pool resource experiments study the effects of uncertainty on withdrawal
and depletion. However, these experiments only focus on the size of the pool being un-
known (Budescu et al., 1995; Gustafsson et al., 1990). They found that when there is
uncertainty in the size of the pool, individuals overestimate the size and withdraw more
coins more rapidly. The other uncertainty seen in common-pool resource experiments
is uncertainty of the payoff structure Apesteguia (2006). They found that individual be-
havior was not significantly different from the case where the exact payoff structure was
revealed and the case where individuals were only told that their payoff would be de-
pendent on the number of coins that they withdrew and the number of coins that others
withdrew from the pool. Punishments have been examined and seen to be an effective
tool in both Common-Pool Resource Experiments and Public Goods Games for decreas-
ing withdrawal from the common-pool or increasing contributions to the public good
(Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000; Nikiforakis and Normann, 2008; Ostrom et al., 1992; Wade,
1987). Ga¨chter in his 2007 paper studied the factors which motivate voluntary cooper-
ation through laboratory and field public goods experiments. He was able to eliminate
the warm glow effect (Andreoni, 1990) and pure altruism as reasons for voluntary con-
tribution, finding that more than half of the participants voluntary contributions depend
on the contributions of other group members. With voluntary contributors, the greater
the contributions to the public good of any one individual, the greater the contributions
from other members of the same group (Ga¨chter, 2007). Ga¨chter finds that without pun-
ishment conditional cooperation unravels (2007). Additional threshold Public Goods
Games examined the relationship between fear, trust and individual contributions. Lack
of trust and fear that others would not contribute were two of the leading causes for a
lack of provision or under provision of the public good. (Rapoport, 1967; Dawes et al.,
VOL. 1 NO. 1 EFFECTS OF THRESHOLD UNCERTAINTY ON COMMON-POOL RESOURCES 9
1986; Yamagishi and Sato, 1986; Parks and Hulbert, 1995; DeCremer, 1999). Another
area of public goods and common pool resource games which have been addressed by
the literature are externalities. Plott (1983), Walker and Gardner (1992) and Walker and
Gardner (1992) found that individuals tend to ignore externalities, meaning that the ex-
ternalitity had no impact on market behavior. “They find rapid and complete depletion
of the resource. In many instances the rates of depletion exceed the Nash-equilibrium
prediction,” (Andreoni, 1995).
II. Experimental Design and Game Play
This experiment looks at how uncertainty with regard to the location of a threshold im-
pacts common-pool resource depletion. The experiment was implemented using z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 1997). Sessions lasted close to an hour, including reading through the in-
structions. Individuals were randomly assigned to a group of five and placed at their own
computer terminal. Participants did not know the identities of the other members of their
group or those in other groups. Instructions were given to the participants and also read
aloud (see Appendix - Instructions). Subjects were informed that they would be inter-
acting with four other people in the laboratory. Participants were able to withdraw up to
twenty-five tokens a period from a common-pool that initially had 1000 tokens. After
each period, the pool recharged as a function of the remaining tokens in the pool. When
the number of tokens dropped below a certain level, 327 tokens, the recharge stopped
and individuals would be faced with a penalty, the loss of 13 of their personal tokens. The
game play continued until all withdrawing group members, four individuals, could not
withdraw their allotted twenty-five tokens (less than 100 tokens), or for an undisclosed
amount of time.9 The number of periods of game play represents the longevity of the
common-pool resource. After completing the experiment, individuals answered a brief
questionnaire to reveal a few personal characteristics. At the conclusion of the exper-
iment they were paid $0.025 for each token in their private fund. Using the recharge
9Time limits were not disclosed to prevent end-game effects and ensure that the experiment did not continue forever.
For experimental treatments one and two, Complete Information and Incomplete Information, the time limit was 35
minutes of play. Sporadically Enforced Targets, experimental treatment three, was given 45 minutes of play. An additional
10 minutes were given to account for the actions required of the 5th player in this particular treatment.
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function and the results from previous CPR experiments, this was calculated so that par-
ticipants would receive an average of 15 dollars. There were three different treatments in
this experiment: 1.)Threshold CPR with Complete Information, 2.) Threshold CPR with
Incomplete Information, and 3.)Threshold CPR with Sporadically Enforced Targets.
A. Treatment 1- Threshold Common-Pool Resource Experiment With Complete Information
In the first treatment, Threshold CPR with Complete Information, the groups were in-
formed of the location of the threshold, the point where recharge stopped and individuals
would lose one-third of their tokens. This game had four group members interacting
with each other (through computer terminals) and withdrawing tokens each period from
a common pool and a fifth player who sat out of the round. The fifth player role rotated
around the group; each player taking a turn sitting out. See Figure 1. The fifth player sat
out of the round to maintain consistency with the two other experimental treatments in
which the fifth player had another role. This treatment served as a control in which the
true threshold and policy target was revealed and would be, without fail, enforced.
FIGURE 1.
Threshold CPR with Complete Information (experimental treatment 1). All players are informed of the true threshold.
One player sits out of the round while the other four players make their withdrawal decision. After withdrawal and
recharge, they all are informed of the resulting level of the common-pool.
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B. Treatment 2 - Threshold CPR with Incomplete Information
In the second treatment, Threshold CPR with Incomplete Information, players were
not given any information regarding the location of the threshold. They were only in-
formed that the threshold existed. This game had four group members interacting with
each other and withdrawing tokens each period and a fifth player who reveals their be-
liefs regarding the threshold location to the experimenter.10 These beliefs were not shared
with the other group members, but was recorded for analysis.The role of the fifth player
rotated each period. Although participants were not given information about the thresh-
old, they were given the size of the common-pool. Participants were given its initial
size and then were updated on its size after withdrawal and recharge at the beginning
of each period. See figure 2. This treatment will show the effects of allowing individu-
als and groups to develop their own beliefs of the threshold on the lifespan of the CPR
when compared to the other experimental treatments, Complete Information (the control)
and Sporadically Enforced Targets. This treatment will not only serve as a comparison
against the other treatments, but its existence allows for for the development of policy
recommendations.
C. Treatment 3- Threshold CPR with Sporadically Enforced Targets
The third and final treatment, Threshold CPR with Sporadically Enforced Targets,
models a moving policy target with threshold uncertainty, as described in the real world
case of Israel’s “Red Line”. In this game the fifth member of the group played the role of
the policymaker. This role rotated among the group members and was reassigned every
period. At the beginning of each period the new policymaker announced to the other
players via the software program their guess of the threshold. The other four members
then withdrew tokens as in the other two experimental treatments. After withdrawal and
recharge, the policymaker was informed of the level of the common-pool, reminded of
their guess of the location of the threshold, and then given an option of enforcing their
guess. The policymaker could pay 100 tokens to the common-pool to enforce their guess
10Guesses of the threshold were restricted to be between the current size of the pool and 0.
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FIGURE 2.
Incomplete Information (experimental treatment 2). The fifth player develops beliefs as to the location of the threshold
while the four withdrawing players are deciding how many tokens to remove from the common pool. Then, all players
see the level of the common pool after withdrawal and recharge.
of the threshold and inflict a punishment on all the players. The punishment was a loss
of 50 tokens from the private funds of the four withdrawing players. See figure 3. This
treatment represents a changing policy target and unenforced polices which are faced in
real world common-pool resource situations, as illustrated in the Introduction.
D. Rationale
The the punishment threshold was designed and implemented to represented the cross-
ing of an environmental threshold as well as the associated reduction in welfare and
well-being. Sporadically Enforced Targets was designed to closely match moving policy
targets resulting from the conflict between future resource use and bias for the present,
as illustrated in the example of the the moving punishment threshold (“red line”) in Is-
rael’s main body of water. The rotating role of the policymaker and the existence of a
cost to punish and enforce the estimated threshold represents the conflict for the policy-
maker of conservation, facing a cost today, versus uncontrolled consumption. Just as in
the real world case, the policymaker has the option to do nothing and pass the respon-
sibility off onto the next policymaker, which would not address over-consumption and
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FIGURE 3.
Sporadically Enforced Targets (experimental treatment 3). The fifth player, the policymaker, makes an announced guess
of the threshold. The four with drawing players see the current level of the common pool and withdraw their desired
tokens. The policymaker can then enforce their guess of the threshold. After the policymaker makes their enforcement
decision all players see the level of the common pool after withdrawal, token contribution and recharge and they are
notified it they were punished by the policymaker or if they went below the threshold.
jeopardize the life of the common-pool. Since enforcing this punishment is costly and
the role of policymaker will move to another player next period, the announced target or
guess of the threshold will move and the policymaker may choose to pass the responsi-
bility of enforcement to policymakers in future rounds. Alternatively, one could enforce
the predicted threshold or target to prevent individuals from withdrawing too many to-
kens, which otherwise could result in ending the game more quickly and a large loss of
personal tokens. If the punishment is enacted, then the public good is increased. Alterna-
tively, the policymaker may act, paying a personal penalty to enforce warning thresholds
and punishments for protection of the common-pool. 11
11There are other reasons why a participant in the role of the policy maker would choose to not enforce their guess,
but either way the result is the same. The target or announced guess of the threshold changes with each policy maker and
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III. Hypothesis
The three experimental treatments present various options to enable an evaluation of
the use and consequences of thresholds in the setting of a common-pool resource. The
expected result is that being given information which is constantly changing and unen-
forced, like the “red line” in the Kinneret in Israel, (Threshold CPR with Sporadically
Enforced Targets), will result in the resource being depleted more quickly than the cases
for which there is either no announced threshold (Threshold CPR with Incomplete Infor-
mation) or a threshold that is announced (Threshold CPR with Complete Information).
This follows from previous literature, like that of Bloch, Bhattacharya and Daouk, and
Stormshak et al., where unenforced rules and regulations were found to result in more ex-
treme and negative behaviors. This Hypothesis is also drawn from Ga¨chter’s finding that
without punishment conditional cooperation unravels (2007). Other studies found that
uncertainty results in common-pools being depleted more rapidly(Budescu et al., 1995;
Gustafsson et al., 1990). It was hypothesized that the uncertainty with associated the
threshold in in Incomplete Information will result in more tokens being withdrawn and
the CPR being depleted more rapidly than in the Complete Information treatment. With
the extra level of uncertainty in Sporadically Enforced Targets, with uncertainty from
both the target and the threshold, it follows that the CPR will be depleted more quickly
than the other two experimental treatments. It was also hypothesized that since the cost
of punishment is great and the role of the policy maker rotates, participants would not
enforce their guess of the threshold and would instead leave the role of enforcement to
the next policy maker.
IV. Results and Discussion
The experiment was conducted at the University of California, Santa Barbara’s Ex-
perimental and Behavioral Economics Laboratory. There were 180 participants from the
University of California, Santa Barbara’s undergraduate population. In each experimen-
if the target goes unenforced it will appear like the moving “red line” and other unenforced and constantly readjusting
common pool resource management policies.
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tal treatment, each consisting of 5 members, there were 12 groups. Average earnings
were approximately $15, including a $5 show-up fee.
The results sections is divided into four sections. I begin by discussing the Lifespan of
the Common-Pool Resource across the three different experimental treatment groups. I
then support my findings by examining the Total Token Withdrawal From the Common-
Pool Resource. Next, I discuss the Over Withdrawal and Depletion of the Common-Pool.
Finally, in Pre-Threshold and Post-Threshold Behavior individual withdrawal behavior
before the is crossed is compared to their post-threshold behavior. There are four major
results:
• Result. Sporadically Enforced Targets, when non-credibly enforced, results in a significantly shorter common-
pool lifespan. Common-Pool Resource Lifespans increase by providing individuals with reliable information
about thecurrent size of the resource and the location of the threshold (their own beliefs or given information).
• Result. A greater number of tokens is indicative of a greater number of periods of game play.
• Result. Sporadically Enforced Targets results in a significantly fewer number of individual tokens upon the
completion of the game, when compared to both Complete and Incomplete Information. Not only do individ-
ual earnings increase by providing individuals with reliable information about the current size of the resource
and the location of the threshold (given information or their own beliefs), but Common-Pool Resource lifes-
pans increase as well.
• Result. The majority, 77.8%, of groups withdrew tokens in excess of the optimal strategy. Over-withdrawal
resulted in 33 of 36 groups depleting the Common-Pool Resource.
A. Lifespan of the Common-Pool Resource
In this model of games, extending the number of rounds played serves as a measure of
conservation of the common-pool resource. Table 1 displays the number of periods that
the game lasted, the longevity of the common-pool.
In all three experimental treatments there was one group which was considered sustain-
able.12 The sustainable groups were withdrawing close to the optimal amount of tokens,
12The sustainable groups are denoted with an asterisk (*) in Table 1.
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an average of 57 total tokens or less.13,14 This resulted in the common-pool remaining
in the 900-1000 token range for the majority of the game, removing a few tokens each
round and then getting recharged, with very little downwards motion. Continuation of
this process by these groups would allow play to continue indefinitely, creating a sustain-
able resource.
TABLE 1—LONGEVITY OF THE COMMON POOL BY EXPERIMENTAL TREATMENT. EACH NUMBER REPRESENTS
THE NUMBER OF PERIODS OF GAME PLAY BEFORE THE COMMON POOL WAS DEPLETED. THE ASTERISK (*) DENOTE
GROUPS WHICH WERE CONSIDERED SUSTAINABLE AND DID NOT DEPLETE THE COMMON POOL.
Longevity of Common Pool By Treatment: Number of Periods of Play
Threshold CPR with Threshold CPR with Threshold CPR with
Complete Information Incomplete Information Sporadically Enforced Targets
67 25 25
25 109 33
14 26 33
43 21 21
41 36 33
200 24 25
19 24 25
31 55* 58
196* 23 28
43 106 23
54 88 39*
24 20 25
Average : 51 45.6 29.9
Standard Deviation : 51.9 36.2 10.2
The average number of periods of play, including only the non-sustainable groups,
was 51, 45.6 and 29.9 for the Complete Information, Incomplete Information and Spo-
radically Enforced Target experimental treatments, respectively. The time paths of the
common-pools for the three treatments is presented in figures 4 - 6.
Since the variable of interest, the number of periods until depletion, is at the group
13The Social Planner Optimal Strategy is alternating between withdrawing 58 tokens and 55 tokens, averaging 57
tokens throughout the game.
14The optimal number of tokens was calculated using the recharge function. This is the greatest amount of tokens
which can be withdrawn while allowing the common-pool to get recharged at the maximum amount and continue to
remain full.
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level, counting this event results in a very small number of observations, yielding only
twelve observations in each experimental treatment ranging from values of fourteen to
200 as well as three sustainable groups. Therefore the data was sorted into bins for further
evaluation, which limits the effect of variation in the data. The bins were determined by
quartiles. The data was recoded as 1 if it fell in the first quartile and 2 if it fell in the
second quartile, and so on. The sustainable groups, however, were collected into a fifth
bin and recoded as a 5, to distinguish them from the groups which depleted the resource.
FIGURE 4.
Level of tokens remaining in the common pool each period, by group, before the
common pool is depleted under complete information.
After putting the data into bins, Mood’s median tests were performed to test hypotheses
that the treatment samples were drawn from populations with equal medians.15,16 First,
Threshold CPR with Incomplete Information was tested against Threshold CPR with
Sporadically Enforced Targets, resulting in a chi-squared value of 0.000 with one degree
of freedom and a p-value of 1.000. However, the case of interest was the one where there
was no credible enforcement of the guess of the threshold. It was hypothesized that since
the cost of punishment was large, the task of enforcement would be passed on to the next
15This test was chosen since it is a non-parametric test and it handles data that has large observations, like the sustain-
able groups, particularly well (Siegel, 1956).
16Lemeshko,Chimitova, and Kolesnikov (2007) showed there are “no evident problems” with testing hypotheses using
non-parametric tests in cases of grouped data.
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FIGURE 5.
Level of tokens remaining in the common pool from each period, by group, before the
common pool is depleted under incomplete information.
round’s policymaker. Yet this was not always the the case.
Of the twelve groups who played Sporadically Enforced Targets, six fall into the cate-
gory of non-credible enforcement, punishing the other members of their group one time
or less (four groups did not punish at all and two groups only punished once) and six fall
into the category of credible enforcement. Those groups which made credible threats of
punishment, as defined by punishing two or more times, punished throughout the game–
in early rounds and then in later rounds as well. The median test was conducted com-
paring the non-credible enforcement subset to the credible enforcement subset, resulting
in a fisher exact p-value of 0.008, indicating that there is a significant difference in the
longevity of the CPR between credibly enforced and non-credibly enforced groups from
the Sporadically Enforced Targets experimental treatment. The sustainable group fell
into the credible enforcement subset. Conducting a median test on Threshold CPR with
Incomplete Information against the non-credible enforcement subset of Sporadically En-
forced Targets yielded a fisher exact p-value of 0.092; there is a significant difference
between the two treatments’ common pool lifespans at the 90% level. When the policy-
makers from Sporadically Enforced Targets made credible threats of enforcement of their
guesses, there was no significant difference between any of the treatments; median tests
resulted in Fisher Exact P-values of 0.439 when conducted against Threshold CPR with
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FIGURE 6.
Level of tokens remaining in the common pool from each period, by group, before the
common pool is depleted under sporadically enforced targets.
Complete Information and Threshold CPR with Incomplete Information. There is no
significant difference between Threshold CPR with Complete Information and Incom-
plete Information, with a chi-squared value of 0.6667 with one degree of freedom and
0.414. There was no significant difference between Complete Information and Sporad-
ically Enforced Targets, however, comparing Complete Information to the non-credible
enforcement subset yielded results which were significantly different, Fisher Exact P-
value of 0.025. There was no significant difference between Complete Information and
the credible enforced subset of Sporadically Enforced Targets, Fisher Exact P-value of
0.439.
As long as threshold information was available that could be relied upon when mak-
ing one’s withdrawal decision, either from one’s own beliefs or given from a policy-
maker, there was no negative effect on the life of the common-pool resource. However,
being given extra information in some cases can become detrimental to the life of the
common-pool. In the case Threshold CPR with Sporadically Enforced Targets, when the
policymakers shared their guess of the location of the threshold, the extra information,
may crowd out the individual responsibility to develop their own beliefs. It appeared
that each participant only made their guess every fifth turn when they were assigned
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the role of the policymaker. When the policymakers did not enforce the guess, having
developed no belief of their own, the participants were left with no information which
they believed to be credible when making their decision for how many tokens to with-
draw. This is a possible explanation for the significant difference between Threshold
CPR with Incomplete Information and Threshold CPR with Sporadically Enforced Tar-
gets, especially when looking at the groups faced with non-credible enforcement. With
incomplete information, individuals developed their own beliefs, being told only that
there is a threshold of negative consequences and individuals were prompted to guess
on their own by telling the experimenter their guess when not withdrawing, but never
sharing it with the group. Those groups in Sporadically Enforced Targets which made
credible threats of punishment, had information which had to be taken as reliable or
risk getting punished again in the future.17 The groups in Sporadically Enforced Targets
which did enforce their guesses, through punishment and credible threats of punishment,
relied upon the information which they were given, the guesses of the threshold (targets),
and used that to determine how many tokens to withdrawal each period. Not having in-
formation which one could rely upon resulted in a significant reduction in the number
of periods of game play and the lifespan of the common-pool resource. Lack of trust
is one of the main causes of under-provision of public goods and would therefore im-
ply that lack of trust in a common-pool resource setting would lead to a greater level of
withdrawal and a shorter common-pool lifespan (Rapoport, 1967; Dawes et al., 1986;
Yamagishi and Sato, 1986; Parks and Hulbert, 1995; DeCremer, 1999). While trust was
not directly measured, the constant lowering of targets and announced guesses combined
with non-credible enforcement would be a strong contributor to a general lack of trust
within Sporadically Enforced Target groups.
Interestingly, there was no benefit in terms of the length of the life of the common-
pool resource from giving participants the additional information as to where the true
threshold was located. While counter intuitive, this can be attributed to some individuals
17This is consistent with the punishment literature which shows that when implemented, punishment is effective at
conserving a common-pool resource(Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000; Nikiforakis and Normann, 2008; Ostrom et al., 1992).
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having present biased preferences. Individuals knew of the level of 327 as threshold,
but appeared unwilling to give up tokens in the current round and continued to withdraw
tokens at higher than optimal levels, likely thinking that they will withdraw fewer to-
kens the next period as they move closer to the threshold and to the pending punishment.
Every period players went through the same thought process, opting to maximize their
private fund in the current period and withdrawing more than the optimal amount of to-
kens, in hopes of conserving the common-pool resource the next period.18 The benefit of
additional information could be canceled out by individuals’ present biased preferences
and the knowledge that they have time in the future to take fewer tokens before hitting
the threshold. This explains not only why there may not be any added benefit from com-
plete information over incomplete information, but it also can give another reason as to
how the common-pool resource is depleted in under full information.
• Result 1. Sporadically Enforced Targets, when non-credibly enforced, results in a significantly shorter common-
pool lifespan. Common-Pool Resource Lifespans increase by providing individuals with reliable information
about the current size of the resource and the location of the threshold (their own beliefs or given informa-
tion).
B. Token Withdrawal from the Common-Pool Resource
TABLE 2—SUMMARY OF INDIVIDUAL TOTAL TOKEN WITHDRAWAL BY EXPERIMENT.
Summary of Individual Total Tokens
Mean Standard Deviation
Threshold CPR with Complete Information 541.7 699.8
Threshold CPR with Incomplete Information 409.0 307.5
Threshold CPR with Sporadically Enforced Targets 239.3 138.7
Examining the total token withdrawal by individuals at the completion of the game
reveals a strong positive correlation, r = 0.8175, between earnings and lifespan of the
18This follows the idea of present-biased preferences described by O’Donoghue and Rabin(1999) in “Doing it Now or
Later.”
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common-pool. See Figure 7. To make sure that post-threshold behavior and the pun-
ishment was not playing a major role, the pre-threshold relationship was also examined.
This, too, showed a strong positive correlation with r = 0.8253. See Figure 8. The longer
the lifespan of the common-pool, the more opportunities to earn tokens. From this, one
can infer that earning more tokens is indicative of increased lifespan of the common-
pool. As verification, all individuals were placed in bins according to the length of game
play. The top earners who played the most periods were compared to the top earners
who played the fewest periods, with average earnings of 1498.5 and 236.4 respectively.
These two groups were compared using a rank sum test, resulting in a test statistic of
-4.828, which is significant at the 99% level. This shows that the top earners did come
from the groups who played the greatest number of periods and were able to maximize
the lifespan of the common-pool. Therefore, one is able to conclude that more tokens
also represent a longer lifespan of the CPR. All players’ total token withdrawal can then
be evaluated by which experimental treatment game one played. This is then used as an
additional tool for determining the lifespan of the CPR under the various conditions in
the different treatments. The average total token withdrawal by treatment can be seen
in Table 2. Even with a larger sample size normality cannot be assumed (see figure 9),
and the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test, a non-parametric test, will be used to compare total
tokens across the different treatments (Siegel, 1956). Conducting a Rank-Sum test on
the Complete Information level of total tokens against the Sporadically Enforced Targets
level of total tokens generated a test statistic of z = 3.328; Sporadically Enforced Targets
had significantly fewer total tokens than Complete Information at the 99% level (p-value
= 0.0009). A Rank-Sum test on the Incomplete Information level of total tokens against
the Sporadically Enforced Targets level of total tokens yielded a test statistic of z = 3.052
and found that Sporadically Enforced Targets had significantly fewer total tokens than
Incomplete Information at the 99% level (p-value = 0.0023). A Rank-Sum test on the
Incomplete Information level of total tokens against the Complete Information level of
total tokens results in a test statistic of z = 1.3443, confirming our earlier results that there
is no significant difference between Complete and Incomplete Information (p-value =
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0.8481). Since those who played the Sporadically Enforced Targets earned fewer tokens
and fewer tokens are indicative of a shorter CPR lifespan, these findings are support-
ive of the previous findings; Sporadically Enforced Targets results in a reduction of the
lifespan of a CPR. The Complete Information Common-Pool lifespan had no significant
gains over Incomplete Information. Information regarded as reliable whether provided
or based on one’s own beliefs presents no harm to the life of the common-pool. All in-
formation which is perceived as reliable has significant gains over sporadically enforced
targets.
• Result 2. A greater number of tokens is indicative of a greater number of periods of game play.
• Result 3. Sporadically Enforced Targets results in a significantly fewer number of individual tokens upon the
completion of the game, when compared to both Complete and Incomplete Information. Combining these
findings with Result 2, Result 1 is further supported. Therefore, not only do individual earnings increase by
providing individuals with reliable information about the current size of the resource and the location of the
threshold (given information or their own beliefs), but Common-Pool Resource lifespans increase, as well.
FIGURE 7.
Scatter Plot showing the strong positive relationship, r = 0.8175, between total tokens
earned per individual at the end of the game and Periods played. (N=130)
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FIGURE 8.
Scatter Plot showing the strong positive relationship, r = 0.8253, between total tokens
earned per individual the last period before crossing the threshold and Periods played.
(N=130)
C. Over Withdrawal and Depletion
The optimal social planner solution for token withdrawal is a strategy of alternating
between 58 and 55 tokens, an average of 57 tokens each period. 19 See Figure 10.
This is the greatest level of withdrawal which recharges the common-pool to full capac-
ity. If participants continue to withdraw at this level the common-pool continually gets
recharged to full capacity while adding the maximum tokens to one’s private fund. The
CPR remains full and the game could go one forever in this fashion without crossing
the threshold. Any strategy of taking out a greater number of tokens than the optimal
would result in a reduction in total earnings. In order to prevent crossing the threshold,
which would result in a significant reduction of earnings by losing a fraction of one’s
19In a one hour session the greatest number of periods that one could play is approximately 200 periods. If one were to
look at the optimal solution for the similar 200 period finite threshold common-pool resource game, just as in the infinite
game described in this paper, it would be to alternate between 58 and 55 tokens. Since the game is finite one would
only do this for the first 188 periods. In period 189 the average group withdrawal would be 95 and then everyone would
withdraw their full token allotment of 25 tokens, for a total group withdrawal of 100 tokens in the last ten periods. This
results in an overall average withdrawal of 58.9. For the 200 period finite game Threshold CPR game this solution would
ensure that that threshold would not be crossed and the game would last all 200 periods, both of which make sure that all
participants total tokens are maximized. Alternating between 58 and 55 tokens for the majority of the game results in the
maximum number of tokens deposited in individuals private funds for the maximum number of periods both in finite and
infinite games.
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FIGURE 9.
Distribution of Individual Total Tokens showing the distribution of total tokens is
positively skewed.
tokens and limiting game play, one would have to decrease withdrawal for several peri-
ods, losing any gains in earning from the initial increase in withdrawal. For example, if
the group were to withdraw 100 tokens in the first period, instead of the optimal 58, in
order to prevent crossing the threshold the group would have to withdraw only 40 tokens
in each of the next twelve periods. In the first period the group would increase their
earnings by 42 tokens, but as a result of the reduction in withdrawal over the following
twelve periods it would cost the group a total of 198 tokens. The initial increase in token
withdrawal would not have a net benefit in terms of overall payoff. This is true for all
strategies other than the alternating 58 and 55 tokens. With the optimal solution the pool
initially decreases when 58 tokens are withdrawn, but it is then immediately refilled the
next period when only 55 tokens are withdrawn. Although the threshold would not be
cross if any fewer than 58 or 55 tokens are withdrawn, this, too, is a non-optimal solution
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since a greater number of tokens could have been placed in all individuals private funds
by increasing withdrawal.
FIGURE 10.
Based on the recharge function, this graph displays the number of tokens which will be
added back to the common-pool after withdrawal (in blue). Taking recharge into
account, it also displays the total number of tokens that need be withdrawn from the
common-pool in order for the pool to have fewer tokens the next round (in red).
The majority of all groups, 77.7%, over extracted the resource, withdrawing more
than the optimal amount. The average amount of withdrawal was 66.5 tokens period.
See Table 3. With half, 50%, of the groups given complete information withdrawing
more than the optimal level. The average withdrawal was 61.7 tokens and was just over
the 57 average optimal tokens. Incomplete information had an average withdrawal of
66.5 with 88.3% of groups on average over withdrawing. Sporadically Enforced Targets
had a higher average token withdrawal, 71.3, with 100% of groups on average having
excess withdrawal.
The Common-Pool Resource was overwhelmingly depleted in all three experimental
treatments. Only three groups received the label of “sustainable.” All other groups de-
pleted the resource. While 22% of groups did have an average withdrawal which was
at or below the optimal level, with the majority coming from the Complete Information
treatment, these groups were not able to maintain this level of withdrawal. As seen in
Figure 4- Figure 6 showing the number of tokens remaining in the CPR, groups would
start off withdrawing an optimal or close to optimal amount and then one or more group
members would want more tokens, collapsing all group cooperation. When groups were
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cooperating, the level of tokens in the pool remained close to 1000. Eventually, the
groups which were withdrawing close to the optimal level of withdrawal would deplete
the CPR. The longer the group was close to 1000 means that cooperation in the group
lasted for a greater number of periods. Some groups would over withdraw in initial
rounds, decreasing the size of the common-pool. In this event, even if a group were to
adopt the strategy of withdrawing 58 and 55 tokens in a later round, it would no longer
be the strategy which would result in returning the CPR to full capacity. Due to excess
withdrawal, the Common-Pool Resource was depleted in all three experimental treat-
ments with the exception of one sustainable group in each treatment.
• Claim. The optimal social planner solution for token withdrawal is a strategy alternating between 58 and 55
tokens. These are the maximum number of tokens which can be taken out each period with out decreasing
the pool. If the pool were to decrease the the number of periods in the game would decrease along with one’s
future potential earnings. One also moves closer towards the threshold and the lilkihood of losing 13 of one’s
private fund increases.
• Result 4. The majority of groups, 77.8%, withdrew tokens in excess of the optimal strategy. Over-withdrawal
resulted in 33 of 36 groups depleting the CPR.
TABLE 3—AVERAGE GROUP TOKEN WITHDRAWAL.
Average Group Percentage Of Groups
Token Withdrawal with Average Above Optimal
Threshold CPR with Complete Information 61.7 50
Threshold CPR with Incomplete Information 66.5 83.3
Threshold CPR with Sporadically Enforced Targets 71.3 100
All Groups 66.5 77.8
D. Pre-threshold and Post-threshold Behavior
Before crossing the threshold individuals were withdrawing tokens at levels signif-
icantly below their 25 token maximum allowances. This can be seen in Figure 11 in
which the two periods prior to the threshold being crossed are examined. Two periods
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before the threshold was crossed the average amount of tokens withdrawn by an individ-
ual was 14.25. One period before the threshold was crossed the average withdrawal was
16.15 tokens. After the threshold was crossed and recharge to the common-pool ceased
and individuals withdrew more tokens for their private fund. The number of individuals
who were withdrawing their full allotted 25 tokens more than doubled and the average
withdrawal increased to 21.6, 21.57, and 22.05 for the first, second and third period after
the threshold was crossed, respectively. Once recharge was terminated, by crossing the
threshold, there no longer existed an incentive to slowly withdraw tokens from the CPR.
Individuals entered into a race with their group members to deplete the resource. If one
did not take their full 25 tokens another player could withdraw the remaining tokens for
their private fund (while remaining within their 25 token limit). Previously there was an
incentive to leaving tokens in the common-pool, without recharge that incentive is non-
existent. If players do not put tokens into their private fund another player will. Tokens
will not remain in the common-pool.
V. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
A. Conclusion
Common-Pool Resources can have a threshold for consequences. Policymakers, in
order to delay users of the resource from crossing this threshold, set their own targets
which they claim will be enforced. These targets are repeatedly readjusted with no en-
forcement. In the laboratory, this process of Sporadically Enforced Targets resulted in
a reduction of the Common-Pool Resource lifespan and decreased profits. Individuals
were not able to rely on the information they were given. Having information upon
which one can rely, individuals made decisions which allowed the common-pool to have
a greater life. Without knowing the exact location of the threshold people were able to
develop beliefs and rely on that. Any reliable information, either given or from one’s
own beliefs, provided significant gains over Sporadically Enforced Targets both in terms
of individual gains and the lifespan of the Common-Pool Resource.
While this paper is the first to examine threshold common pool resources and threshold
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Conclusion
FIGURE 11.
Individual token withdrawal pre-threshold and post-threshold shows an increase in
withdrawal once the threshold is crossed.
common pool resources with uncertainty, the finding of this laboratory build on previous
literature. The shorter common-pool lifespan exhibited under Sporadically Enforced Tar-
gets resulting from a lack of enforcement and uncertainty of the punishment threshold is
consistent with the unraveling of conditional cooperation in the absence of punishment
(Ga¨chter, 2007). Consistent with the punishment literature (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000;
Nikiforakis and Normann, 2008; Ostrom et al., 1992; Wade, 1987), when punishments
and policy targets were enforced they were an effective tool for reducing individual with-
drawal from the common-pool resource and increasing its longevity. In contrast, when
left unenforced they increased resource use and decreased the resource lifespan. Pre-
vious literature with uncertainty within common-pool resources focused on uncertainty
in the resource size, finding that users withdrew greater amounts of the resource more
rapidly (Budescu et al., 1995; Gustafsson et al., 1990). In contrast to the literature, when
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uncertainty was placed on a punishment threshold, as in the Incomplete Information ex-
perimental treatment, there was no significant difference in individual token withdrawal
or common-pool lifespan when compared again the treatment without uncertainty, the
Complete Information experimental treatment. This is consistent with the uncertainty
associated with Sporadically Enforced Targets. Individuals withdrew more tokens, more
rapidly depleting the CPR when the threshold as well as the policy targets involved ele-
ments of uncertainty.
Threshold uncertainty in CPRs results in resource users consuming the resource in
excess of the optimal level and depleting the resource more quickly than they would in
cases of full information. Sporadically Enforced Targets, when non-credibly enforced,
results in both a shorter common-pool lifespan and decreased earnings. Providing in-
dividuals with reliable information about the size of the CPR and the location of the
threshold (given information or their own beliefs) will result in both economic gains and
resource preservation.
B. Policy Recommendations
In order to effectively conserve a threshold common-pool resource and maximize its
lifespan, policymakers should make resource users aware that a threshold exists and of
the size of the common-pool. While one might argue that making the resource users
aware of the location of the threshold should be the recommended policy, that would not
be advisable in a real world situation. My findings indicate that addition of true reli-
able information beyond one’s own beliefs had no significant gains in the lifespan of the
common-pool resource. Additionally, due to governmental present-biased preferences
(Horowitz, 1996), announced targets and estimates of threshold locations cannot be per-
manently and irrevocably established. For this reason these estimates (targets), will often
get readjusted, resulting in a situation in which a real world Complete Information case
will morph into a situation much like our Sporadically Enforced Targets. Since Thresh-
old Common-Pool Resources under Sporadically Enforced Targets had a significantly
shorter lifespan and produced smaller individual earning than when individuals were
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able to rely on their beliefs alone, I determined that if one cannot count on announced
targets, or policies, to be credible, the best policy would be one in which individuals
developed their own beliefs. My findings support the notion that governments and pol-
icymakers should be more firm with thresholds that they set, while also demonstrating
that a threshold which is unenforced is more detrimental than no threshold at all.
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EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS
A1. Threshold Common Pool Resource Experiment with Complete Information Instructions
If you have any questions as we go through these instructions, please raise your hand
and one of the monitors will come and answer your question.
In this game, you will have the opportunity to earn cash rewards. The amount that
you earn will depend upon the independent decisions that you make and also upon the
independent decisions that the others in your group make. You will receive a minimum
of $5 for showing up and participating. You will be playing with tokens on the computer.
Each token is worth $0.025 and your earnings are dependent on how many tokens you
collect into your private fund. The more tokens you have at the end of the game, the
more money you earn, so it is in your interest to accumulate tokens and increase your
pay, while avoiding penalties that will cause you to lose tokens and decrease your pay.
Each of you has been randomly assigned to a group of 5 members. All members of
your group are in this room. However, there is no communication or collaboration among
the members of your group, and all decisions are made independently.
36 OCTOBER 2014
Each group will start with a shared, common pool of 1000 tokens. The roles of each
of 5 players will rotate around the group each round, similar to changing the dealer in
a game of cards. In each round there will be 4 group members who are withdrawing
tokens. The 5th member will sit out of the round.
When you are in the role of a withdrawing player, each round provides the oppor-
tunity to collect tokens from the common pool and increase your private fund. After
all members have completed the round, the common pool will get partially refilled or
“recharged,” by the computer, which will add more tokens back to the common pool to-
tal. The more tokens left in the common pool at the end of a round, the more additional
tokens get added back to recharge and refill the pool. Similarly, the fewer tokens left in
the common pool at the end of a round, the fewer additional tokens get added back to
recharge and refill the pool. This is similar to earning interest or a reward based on the
amount of tokens in the common pool. There is an opportunity to keep the common pool
large which would allow more rounds of play to increase your private fund.
However, if the total number of tokens in the common pool gets too low - drops below
327 tokens - there will be negative consequences for all group members. This is similar
to a requirement to maintain a minimum account balance in the common pool. If the
common pool drops below the threshold of 327, for the rest of the game there will be
no recharge - the pool will not be refilled after each round - and, in addition, each group
member will lose 13 of the tokens on hand in their private fund.
When you are one of the 4 withdrawing players, you individually decide how many
tokens you would like to withdraw from the common pool to add to your private fund,
knowing that the other players are doing the same. You will be shown the current num-
ber of tokens in the common pool and the maximum number of tokens which you can
remove. You are allowed to take out from 0 up to 25 tokens each round. You will enter
the desired number in the box on the computer screen and then click the “OK” button.
The other members of your group will also be making their own independent with-
drawal decisions. The tokens which you remove from the common pool will get placed
in your private fund and are not available to other members, and likewise, the tokens
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withdrawn by other members of the group are placed in their own individual private
funds and are not available to you.
After all members have taken their desired tokens from the common pool, as long as
the common pool remains above the 327 token threshold, the pool will get recharged. At
the conclusion of the round, after all 4 players have chosen their amount of withdrawal,
a screen will display the total number of tokens currently in the common pool and the
number of tokens collected into your private fund.
If at the end of the round, the number of tokens in the common pool is too low and
is below the threshold, all group members will be notified on the computer screen, they
will all lose 13 of their private fund tokens, and recharge of the common pool will cease.
If the threshold has not been reached, play continues for the next round as before.
A new round will start with the jobs rotated, and a different player will sit out of
the round. Then the 4 withdrawing members will make their independent decisions for
withdrawal from the common pool, from 0 to 25 tokens. As before, the size of the pool
and the total number of tokens in your private fund will be displayed. Play will continue
until the common pool level is “broke” - so small that all withdrawing members cannot
withdraw their maximum allotment.
All decisions will be kept anonymous. The number of tokens in your private fund at
the end of the experiment will determine your earnings. Each token in your private fund
will be converted to 2.5 cents.
Remember:
• 1 token = $0.025
• You will receive a show-up payment of $5
• You withdraw 0 to 25 tokens each period from the common pool that is available to
all players
• When the total number of tokens in the common pool gets too low, below the 327
tokens:
• Recharge to the pool STOPS for the rest of the game
•All group members lose 13 of their tokens 111111111
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• The more tokens you have at the end of the game, the more money you earn, so it
is in your interest to accumulate tokens and increase your pay, while avoiding penalties
that will cause you to lose tokens and decrease your pay.
The tokens which you remove from the common pool will get placed in your private
fund and are no longer available to other members, and likewise, the tokens withdrawn
by other members of the group are placed in their own individual private funds and are
no longer available to you.
A2. Threshold Common Pool Resource Experiment with Incomplete Information Instructions
Instructions:
If you have any questions as we go through these instructions, please raise your hand
and one of the monitors will come and answer your question.
In this game, you will have the opportunity to earn cash rewards. The amount that
you earn will depend upon the independent decisions that you make and also upon the
independent decisions that the others in your group make. You will receive a minimum
of $5 for showing up and participating. Most people earn $15 on average. You will
be playing with tokens on the computer. Each token is worth $0.025 and your earnings
are dependent on how many tokens you collect into your private fund. The more tokens
you have at the end of the game, the more money you earn, so it is in your interest to
accumulate tokens and increase your pay, while avoiding penalties that will cause you to
lose tokens and decrease your pay.
Each of you has been randomly assigned to a group of 5 members. All members of
your group are in this room. However, there is no communication or collaboration among
the members of your group, and all decisions are made independently.
Each group will start with a shared, common pool of 1000 tokens. The roles of each
of 5 players will rotate around the group each round, similar to changing the dealer in
a game of cards. In each round there will be 4 group members who are withdrawing
tokens. The 5th member will play the role of a policy maker and will have a different
task at the beginning of each round, just like the dealer has a different role in card games.
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When you are in the role of a withdrawing player, each round provides the oppor-
tunity to collect tokens from the common pool and increase your private fund. After
all members have completed the round, the common pool will get partially refilled or
“recharged,” by the computer, which will add more tokens back to the common pool to-
tal. The more tokens left in the common pool at the end of a round, the more additional
tokens get added back to recharge and refill the pool. Similarly, the fewer tokens left in
the common pool at the end of a round, the fewer additional tokens get added back to
recharge and refill the pool. This is similar to earning interest or a reward based on the
amount of tokens in the common pool. There is an opportunity to keep the common pool
large which would allow more rounds of play to increase your private fund.
However, if the total number of tokens in the common pool gets too low - drops below
a certain threshold - there will be negative consequences for all group members. This is
similar to a requirement to maintain a minimum account balance in the common pool.
If the common pool drops below the threshold, for the rest of the game there will be no
recharge - the pool will not be refilled after each round - and, in addition, each group
member will lose 13 of the tokens on hand in their private fund. The game changing
threshold amount is not revealed to the group members, until after the number of tokens
in the common pool is less than the threshold.
At the beginning of each round, the policy maker will secretly make an official guess
for the location of the threshold. This will be done on the computer, entering the number
of tokens in the common pool believed to be the threshold where the negative conse-
quences will go into effect. For example, if the policy maker enters “999” this means
that (s)he believes that when the common pool drops below 999 tokens, recharge will
stop and everyone will lose 13 of their tokens. If the policy maker enters “3” this means
that (s)he believes that when the common pool drops below 3 tokens, recharge will stop
and everyone will lose 13 of their tokens. Of course, the policy maker may not choose a
threshold higher than the number of tokens currently in the pool. While each guess of
the value of the threshold is stored in the computer and is linked to the policy maker, it
is secret and not revealed to other members of the group.
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When you are one of the 4 withdrawing players, you may guess for yourself, if you
wish, where you think the threshold might be, and then individually decide how many
tokens you would like to withdraw from the common pool to add to your private fund,
knowing that the other players are doing the same. You will be shown the current num-
ber of tokens in the common pool and the maximum number of tokens which you can
remove. You are allowed to take out from 0 up to 25 tokens each round. You will enter
the desired number in the box on the computer screen and then click the “OK” button.
The other members of your group will also be making their own independent with-
drawal decisions. The tokens which you remove from the common pool will get placed
in your private fund and are not available to other members, and likewise, the tokens
withdrawn by other members of the group are placed in their own individual private
funds and are not available to you.
After all members have taken their desired tokens from the common pool, as long as
the common pool remains above the actual threshold, the pool will get recharged. At the
conclusion of the round, after all 4 players have chosen their amount of withdrawal and
5th player has made entered their secret guess of the threshold, a screen will display the
total number of tokens currently in the common pool and the number of tokens collected
into your private fund.
If at the end of the round, the number of tokens in the common pool is too low and
is below the threshold, all group members will be notified on the computer screen, they
will all lose 13 of their private fund tokens, and recharge of the common pool will cease.
If the threshold has not been reached, play continues for the next round as before.
A new round will start with the jobs rotated, and a different player in the role of policy
maker, making a secret guess of the threshold. Then the 4 withdrawing members will
make their independent decisions for withdrawal from the common pool, from 0 to 25
tokens. As before, the size of the pool and the total number of tokens in your private
fund will be displayed. Play will continue until the common pool level is “broke” - so
small that all withdrawing members cannot withdraw their maximum allotment.
All decisions will be kept anonymous. The number of tokens in your private fund at
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the end of the experiment will determine your earnings. Each token in your private fund
will be converted to 2.5 cents.
Remember:
• 1 token = $0.025
• You will receive a show-up payment of $5
• You withdraw 0 to 25 tokens each period from the common pool that is available to
all players
• Each round a rotating policy maker makes a secret official guess of the value of the
threshold
• When the total number of tokens in the common pool gets too low, below the thresh-
old:
• Recharge to the pool STOPS for the rest of the game
• All group members lose 13 of their tokens 111111111
• The more tokens you have at the end of the game, the more money you earn, so it
is in your interest to accumulate tokens and increase your pay, while avoiding penalties
that will cause you to lose tokens and decrease your pay.
The tokens which you remove from the common pool will get placed in your private
fund and are no longer available to other members, and likewise, the tokens withdrawn
by other members of the group are placed in their own individual private funds and are
no longer available to you.
A3. Threshold Common Pool Resource Experiment with Sporadically Enforced Targets
Instructions
Instructions:
If you have any questions as we go through these instructions, please raise your hand
and one of the monitors will come and answer your question.
In this game, you will have the opportunity to earn cash rewards. The amount that
you earn will depend upon the independent decisions that you make and also upon the
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independent decisions that the others in your group make. You will receive a minimum
of $5 for showing up and participating. You will be playing with tokens on the computer.
Each token is worth $0.025 and your earnings are dependent on how many tokens you
collect into your private fund. The more tokens you have at the end of the game, the
more money you earn, so it is in your interest to accumulate tokens and increase your
pay, while avoiding penalties that will cause you to lose tokens and decrease your pay.
Each of you has been randomly assigned to a group of 5 members. All members of
your group are in this room. However, there is no communication or collaboration among
the members of your group, and all decisions are made independently.
Each group will start with a shared, common pool of 1000 tokens. The roles of each
of 5 players will rotate around the group each round, similar to changing the dealer in
a game of cards. In each round there will be 4 group members who are withdrawing
tokens. The 5th member will play the role of a policy maker and will have a different
task at the beginning of each round, just like the dealer has a different role in card games.
When you are in the role of a withdrawing player, each round provides the oppor-
tunity to collect tokens from the common pool and increase your private fund. After
all members have completed the round, the common pool will get partially refilled or
“recharged,” by the computer, which will add more tokens back to the common pool to-
tal. The more tokens left in the common pool at the end of a round, the more additional
tokens get added back to recharge and refill the pool. Similarly, the fewer tokens left in
the common pool at the end of a round, the fewer additional tokens get added back to
recharge and refill the pool. This is similar to earning interest or a reward based on the
amount of tokens in the common pool. There is an opportunity to keep the common pool
large which would allow more rounds of play to increase your private fund.
However, if the total number of tokens in the common pool gets too low - drops below
a certain threshold - there will be negative consequences for all group members. This is
similar to a requirement to maintain a minimum account balance in the common pool.
If the common pool drops below the threshold, for the rest of the game there will be no
recharge - the pool will not be refilled after each round - and, in addition, each group
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member will lose 1/3 of the tokens on hand in their private fund. The game changing
threshold amount is not revealed to the group members, until after the number of tokens
in the common pool is less than the threshold.
At the beginning of each round, the policy maker will secretly make an official guess
for the location of the threshold. This will be done on the computer, entering the number
of tokens in the common pool believed to be the threshold where the negative conse-
quences will go into effect. For example, if the policy maker enters “999” this means
that (s)he believes that when the common pool drops below 999 tokens, recharge will
stop and everyone will lose 1/3 of their tokens. If the policy maker enters “3” this means
that (s)he believes that when the common pool drops below 3 tokens, recharge will stop
and everyone will lose 1/3 of their tokens. Of course, the policy maker may not choose a
threshold higher than the number of tokens currently in the pool.
This guess will be announced to the rest of the group.
After seeing the policy maker’s guess of the threshold, when you are one of the 4 with-
drawing players, you may guess for yourself, if you wish, where you think the threshold
might be, and then individually decide how many tokens you would like to withdraw
from the common pool to add to your private fund, knowing that the other players are
doing the same. You will be shown the current number of tokens in the common pool
and the maximum number of tokens which you can remove. You are allowed to take out
from 0 up to 25 tokens each round. You will enter the desired number in the box on the
computer screen and then click the “OK” button.
The other members of your group will also be making their own independent with-
drawal decisions. The tokens which you remove from the common pool will get placed
in your private fund and are not available to other members, and likewise, the tokens
withdrawn by other members of the group are placed in their own individual private
funds and are not available to you.
After all members have taken their desired tokens from the common pool, as long as
the common pool remains above the actual threshold, the pool will get recharged. The
policy maker will then see the current number of tokens in the pool after withdrawal
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and recharge. They will then have the option to enforce their guess and punish the other
group members for getting too close to where they believe the threshold is located, for
taking out too many tokens. If they decide to punish, in exchange for 100 personal tokens
paid back to the common pool, 50 tokens are removed from the private funds of the 4
withdrawing players. These tokens disappear.
At the conclusion of the round, after all 4 players have chosen their amount of with-
drawal and policy maker has made entered their punishment decision, a screen will dis-
play the total number of tokens currently in the common pool and the number of tokens
collected into your private fund.
After all 4 players have chosen their amount of withdrawal and the policy maker has
made enforcement decision, a screen will display the total number of token in the com-
mon pool and the number of tokens in your private fund. If the policy maker should
choose to punish the other group members you will be notified.
A new round will start with the jobs rotated, and a different player in the role of policy
maker, making an announced guess of the threshold. Then the 4 withdrawing members
will make their independent decisions for withdrawal from the common pool, from 0 to
25 tokens. This is followed by the policy maker making their enforcement decision. As
before, the size of the pool and the total number of tokens in your private fund will be
displayed. Play will continue until the common pool level is “broke” - so small that all
withdrawing members cannot withdraw their maximum allotment.
You will be notified if the policy maker chose to punish. You will also be notified when
the number of tokens in the pool has reached the true threshold, the number of tokens is
too low and negative consequences have taken place.
All decisions will be kept anonymous. The number of tokens in your private fund at
the end of the experiment will determine your earnings. Each token in your private fund
will be converted to 2.5 cents.
Bankruptcy: If you should have negative tokens at any point, you can invest your $5
show-up payment into the game to cover your loss.
Remember:
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• 1 token = $0.025
• You will receive a show-up payment of $5
• You withdraw 0 to 25 tokens each period from the common pool that is available to
all players
• Each round a rotating policy maker makes an announced guess of the value of the
threshold
• The policy maker can enforce the guess of the threshold:
• Paying 100 tokens to the common pool 1111
• Taking away 50 tokens from all other players
• When the total number of tokens in the common pool gets too low, below the thresh-
old:
• Recharge to the pool STOPS for the rest of the game
• All group members lose 13 of their tokens 111111111
• The more tokens you have at the end of the game, the more money you earn, so it
is in your interest to accumulate tokens and increase your pay, while avoiding penalties
that will cause you to lose tokens and decrease your pay.
The tokens which you remove from the common pool will get placed in your private
fund and are no longer available to other members, and likewise, the tokens withdrawn
by other members of the group are placed in their own individual private funds and are
no longer available to you.
